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Abstract
This paper examines, theoretically and empirically, the impact of reproductive ex-
ternalities on fertility behaviour in Kenya. We examine this issue by identifying struc-
tural forms of social interaction operating across individuals belonging to di¤erent ethnic
groups on the number of children ever born. We use the 1998 Demographic and Health
Survey, and meteorological data on Kenya, to examine whether social interactions e¤ects
are important over and above an individuals characteristics in order to explain variations
in fertility. In so doing, we conclude that social interactions are very important for the
fertility behaviour of di¤erent ethnic groups in Kenya.
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1 Introduction
Both economists and demographers have examined the balance between economic and
non-economic factors in orchestrating a fertility transition, as witnessed in historical Eu-
ropean populations and in some East Asian economies over relatively short periods of
time. Classic studies of fertility such as the Princeton Fertility Project highlighted that
the transition to low fertility in historical European populations occurred in a variety of
socio-economic and institutional contexts, with a signicant role being played by the lo-
cal social environment (Coale and Watkins (1986), Federici, Mason, and Sogner (1993)).
More recent studies have emphasised the role of the social climate and the inuence of
social interactions on demographic behaviour (Hank (2001), Manski and Mayshar (2003),
Munshi and Myaux (2006). These empirical ndings have led many economists naturally
to focus on modelling the inuence of social interactions on contemporary fertility tran-
sitions (Durlauf and Walker (1999); Manski (1993), Manski and Mayshar (2002)) and on
the reproductive externalities and coordination failures associated with fertility behaviour
per se ((Dasgupta (2000); Kohler (2001); Iyer and Velu (2006)).
Empirical and theoretical analyses of social interactions can be divided into two broad
approaches. One approach considers the impact of social interactions within predeter-
mined groups (Akerlof (1997); Brock and Durlauf (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001)), and
emphasises how interactions a¤ect individual and group-level outcomes in a cross-section.
A second approach analyses how group formation results from social interactions with
particular emphasis on the growth of residential neighbourhoods. This literature has fo-
cused on questions of geographic proximity and dynamic group formation (Borjas (1995);
Ginther, Haverman, and Wolfe (2000); Conley and Topa (2002)).
Our study is located within the rst strand of the literature and examines social
interactions in the context of fertility behaviour in Kenya where groups are considered
predetermined. We conceive of the fertility of a Kenyan woman to be inuenced by
a range of factors such as her individual characteristics and the characteristics of the
household to which she belongs. We postulate that the social environment impinges on
a womans behaviour through the multiple interactions that she undertakes both at the
household level and at the level of other reference groups. In doing so we highlight a
crucial point often overlooked in both the theoretical and empirical literature on this
issue: namely that there are di¤erent levels at which social interactions occur. In doing
so we consider the possibility that both local and global forms of interaction may coex-
ist and be important, characterised by di¤erent mechanisms of social interaction (Horst
and Scheinkman (2003a)). We argue that this has profound implications, both theoret-
ically and empirically, for studies of fertility behaviour and social interactions, and for
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the study of social interactions and economic phenomenon, more widely. The research
presented in this paper quanties the e¤ects of social interactions and group membership
on the number of children ever born. In this respect our work highlights the existence
of uncertainty as to whether these e¤ects are mediated through household composition,
ethnic a¢ liation, a neighbourhood cluster e¤ect, or some combination thereof. There
is thus uncertainty both with respect to the levels at which interactions occur, and the
expressions of structural dependence at each level.
Section 2 summarizes the literature on social interactions and fertility behaviour. In
section 3 we provide an overview of ethnic groups in Kenya, highlighting the charac-
teristics which are relevant for fertility behaviour. In section 4 we present a model of
reproductive externalities with social utility e¤ects. In sections 5 and 6 we consider,
respectively, econometric models of fertility bahaviour and the specication of the con-
ditional mean. Sections 7 examines the question of identication and discusses how we
use unique district-level rainfall data from Kenyas meteorological rainfall stations over
time to identify variations in fertility by ethnic group. In Section 8 we present the demo-
graphic and meteorological rainfall data. We discuss our results in section 9, and section
10 concludes.
2 Social Interactions and Fertility
The conventional economic household demand model of fertility behaviour posits that a
couples fertility is a function of the money costs of children and the opportunity costs
of the value of parental time (Becker (1981)). Conditional upon identifying a xed set of
fundamentals as comprised of a vector of characteristics of both the individual and the
household, an atomistic model of fertility behaviour simply focusses on the direct a¤ects
attributable to a change in these fundamentals. Subsequently, if we then observe that
the variance in fertility outcomes is in excess of that which might be accounted for by
di¤erences in fundamentals,1 an extension of the standard fertility model to allow for the
existence of social multiplier e¤ects would seem reasonable (see, for example, Becker and
Murphy (2000)).
Theoretical work of Dasgupta (2000) and Kohler (2001) has argued that a couples
fertility may be inuenced by the level of fertility of all other couples within a society. In
the most general sense, this is what is meant by social interaction in a fertility context:
it is the public interaction between individuals in a society as they perceive each other
and observe each othersfertility behaviour. This consequently alters their social envi-
ronment, which in turn ultimately inuences their private decision-making about fertility.
1Horst and Scheinkman (2003b) note that any change in the fundamentals exerts direct e¤ects and
indirect e¤ects that have the same sign. They comment that when the indirect e¤ects are very signicant,
the multiplier is very large.
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As a consequence, the existence of social interactions may lead to multiple equilibria and
coordination failures in demographic decision-making, shown by a high level of variabil-
ity in outcomes for a given set of fundamentals. Recent economic analyses of fertility
behaviour have been much concerned with social interactions (see Montgomery, Kiros,
Agyeman, Casterline, Aglobitse, and Hewett (2001), Hank (2001), Nauck (1995), Becker
and Murphy (2000), Kohler (2001), and Manski (2000), Munshi and Myaux (2006)).
In the social interaction literature2 and following Manski (1993), three hypotheses are
often advanced to explain the observation that individuals belonging to a common refer-
ence group tend to behave similarly, even after controlling for a set of observed individual
characteristics. In a fertility context, there is an endogenous e¤ect if, ceteris paribus, a
womans children ever born (CEB) tends to vary with the average CEB of members of
her ethnic group or locality, perhaps because she su¤ers a utility loss from deviations
from group behaviour. There is an exogenous or contextual e¤ect if, ceteris paribus, a
womans CEB tends to vary with (or more plausibly inversely with) the average educa-
tional attainment of her ethnic group or locality. For example, the existence of educated
neighbours may foster positive attitudes towards smaller family size. Finally, there is a
correlated e¤ect if, ceteris paribus, women in the same ethnic group or locality tend to
have similar CEB because they are, for example, similarly wealthy. The importance of
di¤erentiating between these three hypotheses can be seen by examining the respective
policy implications. Consider, for example, an intervention to provide free contraception
to some members of an ethnic group or a number of neighbourhoods. If there are endoge-
nous e¤ects, then an e¤ective policy of free contraception may both directly reduce the
fertility of the recipients but, as their fertility decreases, indirectly reduces the fertility
of all other members of that ethnic group or neighbourhood, with a feedback to further
fertility reductions by the recipients of the free contraception. Exogenous e¤ects and
correlated e¤ects will not, in general, generate this kind of social multiplier e¤ect.
It is possible to conceive of a large number of exogenous e¤ects; in the specic con-
text of fertility behaviour, education plays a particularly prominent role. The e¤ect of
social interactions on fertility behaviour operates through education at multiple levels.
For example, the potential e¤ects of education on fertility can be decomposed into 2
components. The rst is the e¤ect of individual educational attainment on individual-
level fertility. In a developing society, this would be dependent on the money-costs of
acquiring an education and the opportunity costs of wages foregone. Second, there is
also an iconic value of education in the sense that some individuals may aspire to the
attributes of other higher educated groups in a population. In some developing societies,
the iconic value of an education is very high. For example, sociologists of India often
comment on the phenomenon of Sanskritizationin which lower-caste groups take on the
2For an excellent discussion of the theoretical literature on economic models of social interactions and
the inuence of non-market institutions on market institutions see Glaeser and Scheinkman (1999)).
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characteristics and customs of the upper castes in order to gain greater legitimacy and
status in the Indian social system. Frequently this manifests itself in the desire to acquire
an education, or to continue one (Srinivas (1994)).
It is also important to make the distinction between expected versus observed be-
haviour in locating the mechanism by which a group impacts upon individual decision
making. One of the central issues here is the notion that in large groups, individuals
do not observe the behaviour of group members, and therefore the appropriate object is
to consider interaction e¤ects as mediated by subjective expectations. However, such an
argument does not hold in cases where the size of the group is small, such as interaction
e¤ects within extended families of small communities.
3 Overview of ethnic groups in Kenya
Social interactions and channels of message transmission about fertility behaviour are
important at the level of ethnicity. Members of di¤erent ethnic groups speak the same
language, usually adopt similar cultural practices, and with some exceptions in border
areas, reside closely in the same, or in contiguous districts (Fapohunda and Poukouta
(1997)). In the specic case of Kenya it has been argued that cultural norms may en-
courage high fertility but also contribute to fertility decline over time (Caldwell and
Caldwell (1987); Ascadi, Ascadi, and Bulatao (1990)). We argue that individualsmul-
tiple levels of social interactions reect their social identities - regional identities, ethnic
identities, religious identities, linguistic identities. While we do not explore the question
of identity in this paper, we do focus on how local and global interactions that arise from
these identities, signicantly a¤ect individualsbehaviour. Our analysis is based upon
historical and anthropological studies of Kenya with particular focus on the features of
Kenyas major ethnic groups that have relevance for fertility behaviour. In this section
we discuss the ethnic groups with reference to their population composition, the region
of their residence, and three characteristics of these groups which are noteworthy - their
residential pattern of settlement, clan organisation and education. These characteristics
have implications for the politics of ethnicity and fertility in Kenya.
Population The population of Kenya consists of three main groups - the Africans,
Asians and Europeans. Although the last two groups mainly reside in towns, 90% of
the African population continues to live in rural areas (see Meck (1971)). The tribal
groups of rural Kenya live in clearly dened settlements in the more remote areas. In
the Lake Victoria basin, the highlands and the coast, there is a more heterogeneous
population structure (Morgan and Sha¤er (1966):2; Meck (1971): 24). The tribes can be
dened broadly into four groups as classied by their language: the Bantu, the Nilotic,
the Nilo-Hamitic, and the Hamitic. Within these four broad language groups, ethnic
6
groups represent an additional sub-division. According to the 1969 Population Census
there are 42 di¤erent ethnic African groups in Kenya (Rep (1970)). The ve largest
groups, accounting for over 75% of the population, are the Kikuyu (22%), Kamba (11%),
Kalenjin (12%), Luhya (14%) and Luo (18%).3 The Kisii and the Meru both comprise
6% of the total population. Other groups, such as the Maasai and the Somali constitute
15% of the population.4 A religious breakdown of the ethnic groups show that most
Kikuyu are Christians, probably because they were the Kenyan tribe with the closest
links with Christian missions historically (Meck (1971): 27). Over 90% of Luhya and
Luo are Christians, compared to over 60% of Kamba. Some of the Mijikenda sub-groups,
such as the Digo, are Muslim.
Census data from Kenya depict a steady increase in the total population of Kenya
since 1948 to the present. The total fertility rate in Kenya has fallen from an average of 6
births per woman in 1948 to approximately 4.5 births today (Ajayi and Kekovole (1998)).
However, the most signicant declines in fertility have occurred in the last twenty years:
the DHS studies conducted in 1989, 1993 and 1998 showed that the TFR dropped from
6.7 in 1989 and 5.4 in 1993 to 4.7 in 1998. This drop in fertility is considered one of
the most dramatic recorded anywhere in the developed and developing world (Ajayi and
Kekovole (1998): 116). The fertility di¤erences by ethnic group are also very large, as
shown in Table 1. For women aged 15-49, the mean CEB varies from 2.5 for the Kikuyu
to 3.5 for the Luo. Previous studies of fertility and ethnicity in Kenya have revealed that
desired family size is smaller among the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luhya compared to the Luo
(Fapohunda and Poukouta (1997)). The Luo exhibit a strong preference for large families
and it is reported use contraception much less than other groups ( Watkins, Rutenberg,
and Green (1995)).
Region Ethnic boundaries in Kenya, to a very large extent, are coterminous with politi-
cal and administrative boundaries (Fapohunda and Poukouta (1997)). Today the regional
breakdown of the di¤erent ethnic groups is as follows: the Kalenjin reside in the Rift Val-
ley; the Kikuyu live in the Central region, but have also migrated to Nairobi and the Rift
Valley. The Meru/Embu reside in the North and East. The Luhya live in the Western
province, but have also migrated to Nairobi and Mombasa. The Luo live in Nyanza,
with Kisumu as their capital, but have also migrated to the Rift Valley. The Kamba
live in close proximity to Nairobi and exhibit ethnic a¢ liation to the Kikuyu. The Mi-
jikenda/Swahili live in the Coast province. The Meru and Embu groups neighbour the
Kikuyu to the north and east. The Luhya, who live in Kenyas Western province, are a
less homogenous group compared to the Kikuyu and Kamba (Were (1967)). Among the
3According to the most recent Census.
4The Asians, Europeans and Arabs make up about 1% of the population.
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Luhya, there is a distinction that needs to be made between those in the north and those
in areas such as Kakamega, with high population density. Although the Luo who live
in Nyanza depict a rate of population growth almost as high as the Luhya, they are a
more urbanised people (Ominde (1968)). For the Kamba, proximity to Nairobi and their
close ethnic a¢ liation to the Kikuyu are particularly signicant (Berg-Schlosser (1984).
The Mijikenda and Swahili groups who reside in Kenyas Coast province are the most
agricultural of all of Kenya ethnic groups.5
Residential pattern of settlement One of the most notable features of these ethnic
groups is their pattern of residence.6 It is important to emphasise that the notion of
the village in this society is rather more di¤use than in the compact settlements of
Europe and elsewhere. Although there are di¤erences between ethnic groups, families are
grouped mainly in homesteads that are located in clusters, and which form the basis of
community interaction. In some of these clusters, for example, among the Kikuyu there
exist groups of households who are not merely coresident, but also related by blood and
marriage. In other clusters, there are households that are located in close proximity, but
where individuals in these households are not related to other individuals in neighbouring
households.
For example, the Kalenjin live mainly in homesteads that are individual family based.
Property is usually inherited along paternal lines or male agnates. The smallest unit
of territorial composition in Kalenjin society is the temenik or hamlet, a cluster of
homesteads; these are usually grouped into villagesof 15 to 60 temenik. The Kikuyu
live in homesteads on land owned by the family, and surrounded by elds (or shamba).
Traditionally land was owned by many households which constitute the extended family
located on the same ridgewhich is the traditional geographical division7 (Berg-Schlosser
(1984): 50). Supplementing the organisation of Kikuyu society based on kinship, there is
also a geographical demarcation. The ituraor village consists of groups of families. This
is further subdivided into those living on the same ridge. The pattern of Luo settlement
is similar to other communities, although their homesteads usually consist of families
who own land, dispersed as a safeguard against climatic conditions. The Kamba are
also agriculturists, and their pattern of settlement is similar to the Kikuyu (Middleton
and Kershaw (1965)). The traditional land-owning unit is the extended family. In terms
of territorial residence, the most basic unit is the ukambani, which is a homestead that
comprises several extended families. Several of these are grouped to form a kivalo within
5The word Mijikendameans nine townsor tribes. The Mijikenda consist of nine distinct sub-
groups - Giriama, Duruma, Digo, Rabai, Chonyi, Kambe, Kauma, Ribe, and Jibana.
6A key point to note here is that villages are not dened units of settlement, although their boundaries
are well-known locally. These boundaries are usually marked by trees, stones, and so forth (Berg-Schlosser
(1984): 139)
7This was altered with the land reforms of 1950 when ownership of land was transferred to individuals.
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which social interactions, especially marriage, take place. For the Mijikenda, the main
form of residence is the mudzi or village which consists of groups of agriculturists and
sherman.
Clan organisation These tribal groups are also broadly characterised by three main
features that have relevance for social interactions: the importance of the family group,
the clan, and the system of age-grading8 (Meck (1971)). For example, anthropological
studies of the agriculturalist Kikuyu argue that among them, fathers exert a less impor-
tant role for economic decision-making, that relations between the extended family are
strong, and that they exhibit a highly evolved sense of ethnic identity which can often
override more national concerns (Berg-Schlosser (1984), Ferguson and SrungBoonmee
(2003)). Anthropologists comment that among the Kikuyu, the most economically and
socially e¤ective unit is the mbari : a group of families who trace their descent from a
common ancestor following the paternal line, often for up to seven or eight generations.
In addition to its functions as the most important traditional land-holding unit in Kikuyu
society, the mbari is an important social reference-group for many Kikuyu and still plays
an e¤ective role in many economic and social relationships including the more modern
ones. (Berg-Schlosser (1984): 53). We would therefore expect that the endogenous so-
cial interaction e¤ects among this group would emerge as being particularly strong. The
Luhya do not have as powerful a clan organisation as some of the other groups (Meck
(1971): 28). Anthropologists comment that a feature of the Luhya that makes them quite
distinct from other groups is the relatively strict accepted norms of behaviour, particu-
larly with respect to marriage and interactions between the sexes (Berg-Schlosser (1984):
114).
Education Initiated rst by Jomo Kenyatta, education policy in Kenya has been pur-
sued actively by the government, with remarkable success, especially with increases in
primary and secondary school enrolment for girls. However, despite the general increases
in the uptake of education and policies such as school fee remission and the development
of harambee or self-help community schools which foster these, the mean number of years
of schooling di¤ers considerably by ethnicity.
The mean number of years of education varies considerably by ethnic group in Kenya,
as shown in Table 2. This factor has relevance for social interactions as we might expect
the importance of social interactions on fertility to be mediated by the e¤ect of education.
Previous studies of Kenyan fertility argue that the Kikuyu and the Kamba show the
least preference for large families because they had early access to colonial education
8The system of age-grading is a form of vertical stratication which every member of a tribe goes
through during the course of their lives, with each age-grademade distinct from the other with certain
rites of passage (Kenyatta (1961):2; Berg-Schlosser (1984): 55).
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(Fapohunda and Poukouta (1997)). The Kikuyu are the best educated, compared to other
ethnic groups in Kenya (Berg-Schlosser (1984): 60; De Wilde (1967): 39). We can explain
this development historically - many Kikuyu worked as wage labourers in European-
owned plantations and attended schools. As a community, they viewed education as the
means to progress and this led them to acquire positions of responsibility in the colonial
administration. In the post-Independence period, the Kikuyu continued to dominate
and consolidate their position, politically and economically, relative to the other groups
(Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)). The Luhya populations, are also highly literate
groups. Most Kamba are enrolled in formal schooling. Among the Kalenjin, levels of
education are, in general, less than other groups. The Mijikenda and Swahili groups also
depict low levels of education compared to other groups in this population.
Politics of ethnicity Kenya has been much in the news recently because of recent
events which have highlighted the importance of the politics of ethnicity in this country.
Recent evidence has highlighted that di¤erences in the economic performance of ethnic
groups can be traced to their development historically and to economic decisions made
by these groups (Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)). Ethnic identity in Kenya has
always been very strong historically, and it continues to be a very potent force in Kenyas
politics even today. For example, the Kalenjin, who are a heterogenous ethnic group and
who live primarily in Kenyas Rift Valley province (Were (1967)) are closest to Nairobi
geographically, and they are politically and economically Kenyas dominant ethnic group
(Kenyatta (1966)). Their location in the eastern Rift Valley allows them to enjoy a
level of political proximity that, in part, determines their (relatively) superior economic
status. Agricultural innovation rst arose among the Kikuyu who also absorbed land
reform more readily than other groups (Meck (1971): 27). Historically, the Kikuyu were
one of the rst ethnic groups in Kenya to absorb European-style capitalism in the form
of wage labour and participation in the monetary economy, so in contrast for example to
the Maasai whom they neighbour, the Kikuyus subsequent economic performance has
been much better (Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)). 9 In the past the Luo were
less responsive to social and economic change compared to other tribes (Meck (1971)).
For example, land reform met with a great deal of resistance among this group as it was
believed to conict with religious beliefs. But since 2001, the Luo have increasingly been
incorporated into the government. In more recent times, relations between the ethnic
groups has been closely tied with the development of Kenyan politics, particularly since
the introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya since 1991 after over twenty years of
rule by one party (Throup (2001)). The increased strength and importance of the ethnic
9For example, following the Land Transfer Programme, Kikuyu land owners in the Central province
specialised in the production of co¤ee which is widely exported by Kenya, earning these farmers resources
that ensured their success as a community (Ferguson and SrungBoonmee (2003)).
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identity has also led, more worryingly, to ethnic clashes in 1992-93 and in 1997.
So ethnicity - or ethnic group identity - is important for this society. Ethnicity has
displayed an immutability which may be accounted for by the historical evolution of these
population groups, manifest in the recent political history of this nation.
4 A Model of Fertility with Social Interactions
We consider a population in which there is a representative household h10 characterised
by a location j; a type s - here ethnicity - and a vector of characteristics xi:. We assume
that both j and s are xed for all individuals, with characteristics potentially varying
across individuals, type and location. Our point of departure is the standard Beckerian
utility function ( Becker (1981), Willis (1973))
Ui = U(ni; zi;xi; "i); (1)
where Ui denotes the utility function of household i; ni represents the number of children,
zi is all sources of satisfaction to the husband and wife other than those arising from
children, and xi denotes the vector of socio-demographic characteristics which a¤ect
preferences. By including the stochastic term "i we allow for imperfect information on
the part of the analyst. This is subject to the usual budget constraint:
I = nipn + zipz; (2)
where we assume that total income I is expended on children ni and on all sources of
satisfaction other than those arising from children zi; pn and pz are the shadow prices of
children and other sources of satisfaction respectively.
In extending the above atomistic utility model to incorporate a theory of social inter-
actions we rst write
Vi = (U(ni; zi;xi);S
j(ni;n
j
 i); S
s(ni;n
s
 i); "i); (3)
where Vi; total individual utility, is comprised of a private utility term U(); and two
social utility terms: Sj(ni;n
j
 i) represents a social utility term for location j, given by
some function of the number of children choices made by all other residents of j; nj i =
(nj1;n
j
2; :::; n
j
i 1; n
j
i+1; :::; n
j
Mj
), where Mj denotes the number of individuals in location
j: Ss(ni;n
s
 i) represents a social utility term for type s, namely the impact of some
10Note that within the household we consider husbands and wifes preferences to be coincident. In
this respect we do not examine intra-household bargaining between the couple in the determination
of fertility outcomes. For theoretical simplicity, we assume that the householdrepresents the couple.
Empirically this can be translated into a measure of the womans fertility, measured by the total number
of children borne by her.
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function of the number of children choices made by all other members of type s; where
ns i = (n
s
1;n
s
2; :::; n
s
i 1; n
s
i+1; :::; n
s
Ms
). In both cases the extension allows us to capture that
component of individual utility attributable to a fertility choice ni; that is dependent upon
the fertility choices of others. The othersin question may be those, for example, resident
in the individuals household, or others resident in the local community for example, in
the individuals street or neighbourhood. Rewriting (3) as additive in individual and
social utility terms, we have
Vi = U(ni; zi;xi) + S
j(ni;n
j
 i) + S
s(ni;n
s
 i) + "i: (4)
In extending (1) by adding social utility functions Sj(:) and Ss(); our intention is to
develop a model which facilitates a distinction between local and global interactions in
the sense that individual behaviour may also be determined by the decisions of a larger
ethnic group. In referring to a local interaction, individuals have incentives to conform to
the behaviour of a small number of appropriately dened neighbours, whose actions they
can observe. In contrast a global interaction refers to a situation where individuals face
incentives to conform to the expectedbehaviour of a common reference group (Horst
and Scheinkman (2003b)), whose behaviour we cannot observe. What is signicant here is
that both a local and a global interaction can occur simultaneously. This specication in
(3), including more than a single social utility term, allows for multiple social interactions
- namely the possibility that social interaction is both localised within a specic location,
and more di¤use across a larger, geographically di¤use sub-population classied by type.
Such a formulation allows us to examine, for example, whether after controlling for social
interaction e¤ects accruing through geographical proximity, there is a residual e¤ect due
to the desire to conform to a set of behaviours ascribed by ethnicity.
In focussing on that part of total utility attributable to social utility functions Sj(:)
and Ss(:); it is obvious from (4) that cross-partial e¤ects will be key objects. Di¤eren-
tiating the Beckerian rst-order conditions with respect to social interactions yields the
second-order conditions
jil = @
2Sj(ni; nl)=@ni@nl > 0; (5)
sil = @
2Ss(ni; nl)=@ni@nl > 0; (6)
where jil represents a measure of the disutility accruing to i from deviating from the
behaviour of l for i; l 2 j. In examining (5) and (6) we dene strategic complementarity
as representing the increasing marginal utility of woman i as a direct result of the fertility
choices of other women in the group. The precise form of interaction will obviously depend
on the functions Sj and Ss:
If we are willing to assume that social utility exhibits strategic complementarities
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that are totalistic and constant (see Cooper (1988)), then we may impose a number of
restrictions. For example, the restriction jil = 
j=2(Mj   1) is consistent with a model
of uniform local interaction, with equal weights assigned to all members of location j:
We note that although such a restriction may be theoretically di¢ cult to justify, it is
not possible to identify separate measures jil if there is no information as to the relative
location of all i; l within each location. Such a restriction implies that, in the case of
type, all individuals are equally inuential with respect to fertility decisions; and, in the
case of spatially dened clusters, all individuals are located at the centroid.
We consider two forms of social utility which are consistent with totalistic and constant
strategic complementarity. At the level of location j these may be written as
Sj1(ni; n
j
 i) = 1nin
j
 i (7)
Sj2(ni; n
j
 i) =
 2
2
(ni   nj i)2: (8)
(7) represents a proportional spillover form of dependence in the sense that for @Sj1(:)=@ni =
1n
j
 i, strategic complementarities are solely dependent upon the mean level of children
ever born within location j. (8) represents social utility as a measure of conformism with
@S2(:)=@ni = 2(n
j
 i   ni): Under (8) there is an incentive to conform to mean fertility
behaviour within the group with deviations from the mean penalised more severely, rel-
ative to the proportional spillovers case. If behaving like others confers additional status
on a woman, she may desire to conform.11 Note also that although
@2Sjl (:)
@ni@n
j
 i
= l; l = 1; 2;
such that strategic complementarities are captured by a single parameter in both cases.
We note that in anticipating subsequent data constraints we have represented the
social utility function in a way which assumes that all interactions within a group have
equal weight. However, the additional restriction on the social utility terms (as in 7 and
8) that any estimated endogenous interactions are constant over a population is unlikely
to hold, and is not required for identication. For example, in the case of e¤ects which
stem from a desire to conform to a group fertility norm, such a norm may vary across
di¤erent ethnic groups. In the case of the Kikuyu, which reside in clusters comprised
of an extended family, then we have prior information suggesting the (ceteris paribus)
likelihood of greater interaction than other groups.
11There may also be a compelling reason to conform if such status in the community bears economic
benets, e.g. in the allocation of local resources.
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4.1 Measuring Social Interactions: The Choice of Reference
Groups
Given that our data contain no information which points to the existence of specic
groups of individuals which dene a network within which social interaction takes place,12
we acknowledge uncertainty as to what constitutes an appropriate reference group with
respect to fertility decisions. However, using a number of anthropological sources we have
identied that within rural populations in Kenya, fertility decisions are conducted within
families which are members of ethnic groups and which reside mainly in homesteads that
are located in relatively small clusters. These various allegiances, we postulate, then form
the basis of social interaction. Subsequently we emphasise the role of two reference groups.
First, ethnicity postulates that the status of women and attitudes towards children may
di¤er substantially across ethnic groups, with di¤erential evaluation of the psychological
costs and benets of bearing children.13
Second, we have noted that in the case of Kenya, situated between the individual
and the ethnic group, are relatively small clusters of households within which physical
proximity dictates that individuals directly observe and bear the costs of the decisions of
others. In addition we have information which allows us to distinguish between clusters
which, for certain ethnic groups, are comprised of households which are blood related,
with obvious ramications for interaction.14 For example, in the case of the Kikuyu we
might expect the extent of such interaction to be on average higher given that clusters of
households are generally comprised of groups of individuals which are related by blood and
marriage (the mbari). In such a situation one might expect to nd a stronger normative
inuence relative to clusters comprised of households, as in the case of the Kalenjin, who
live mainly in homesteads that are individual family based.
5 Econometric Models of Fertility Behaviour
In motivating a modelling strategy we rst consider the observed data. For each ith
woman we observe fCi;xi; ei; Lijg; where Ci 2 c  f0; 1; 2; :::g represents a count of
the total number of children ever born, xi is a vector of characteristics which includes
individual characteristics, together with ethnic, cluster, and household attributes, e is a
categorical variable indicating group membership, and Lij; j = 1; :::; J denotes the jth
location in which i resides. At the outset we anticipate a number of econometric issues
12For an example where such data exists, see Montgomery, Kiros, Agyeman, Casterline, Aglobitse, and
Hewett (2001)
13There has been a great deal of research on the e¤ects on fertility of religion and ethnic group
membership (see Iyer (2002) for a detailed discussion of this literature).
14In other contexts the locus of interaction might consist of a well-dened set of households who live
within a given geographical space such as a street (see, for example, Guinnane, Moehling, and OGrada
(2001)).
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given that (i) count data is both integer valued and heteroscedastic by construction,15 (ii)
the nature of the interactions across individuals will generate, by construction, a problem
of endogeneity, and (iii) dependent upon the information contained in xi interaction
across i 2 Lj is likely to generate non-independence across the error terms.
Below we consider these issues in the context of a baseline Poisson model.
5.1 Departures from Poisson
The Poisson distribution for the number of children ever born C = 0; 1; 2; :::, is given by
f(Cijxi) = e
 i()i()Ci
Ci!
; Ci = 0; 1; 2; ::: (9)
Given the nonnegativity constraint, the Poisson density in (9) is often accompanied by
an exponential conditional mean function E(Cijxi) = i() = exp(x0i); where  de-
notes a vector of parameters. Although in modelling the determinants of the number
of children ever born to a woman, the Poisson density represents a natural benchmark,
the equidispersion property, namely that E(Cijxi) = V ar(Cijxi) = i() is generally
restrictive.
In the baseline Poisson regression model the maintained assumption of the equality
of the mean and variance has particular implications for our study. Specically this
implies that the randomness of observations on fertility counts with the same value on
the explanatory variable(s) can be described by the same Poisson distribution (i.e., the
same mean). This condition may be violated when there exists a random e¤ect for each
individual and/or there exists a tendency for observations to cluster. At this juncture it
is worth noting that across our sample of married women in Kenya, the mean number of
children is 3.19 with the variance approximately three times the mean (9.38).
In considering a number of more exible specications we rst write the conditional
mean function as
i(; !i) = exp(x
0
i+!i) (10)
= ex
0
ie!i : (11)
(11) accommodates unobserved heterogeneity with the conditional mean represented as
a random variable determined by observed characteristics xi; and variation in a multi-
plicative i.i.d unobserved heterogeneity component, !i: We note that the multiplicative
model handles regressors xi and error terms !i in a symmetric fashion and, in addition,
is congruent with both the Poisson and Generalised Linear Model (GLM) formulation
given that from (10) and for C not equal to zero, ln Ci = x0i + !i, providing a link
15This follows given that for any process bounded at zero, the variance will be an increasing function
of the mean.
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to ordinary least squares. In addition, and as noted by Windmeijer and Santos-Silva
(1996), although multiplicative and additive models are observationally equivalent when
only the rst order conditional mean is specied, there are di¤erences in the presence of
endogeneity and the subsequent choice of instruments in the two specications.
Since !i is unobserved, (10) suggests a random-e¤ects interpretation of this particular
extension. Conditional on !i; the CEB count Ci is distributed Poisson
f(Cijxi; !i) = e
 i(;!i)i(; !i)Ci
Ci!
; Ci = 0; 1; 2; :::; (12)
with the unconditional probability given by
f(Cijxi) =
1R
0
[e i(;!i)i(; !i)Ci=Ci!]g(!i)d!i: (13)
(10) and (12) can then be used to motivate a class of mean-variance models with the
conditional mean nonnegative and the distribution reecting a mean-variance relation-
ship of the form V ar(Cjx) =   E(Cjx); where  and  are unknown parameters.
The model is operationalised by either choosing a functional form for !i, or adopting
a semiparametric estimator. Based on conjugacy, a common fully parametric speci-
cation utilises a gamma distribution for the mixing distribution,16 g(!i); with mean 1
and variance . The resulting mixture of Poisson and gamma components can be inter-
preted as the Negative Binomial model: the rst two moments are E(Cijxi) = i() and
V ar(Cijxi) = i()(1 + i()): Since the negative binomial distribution has one more
parameter than the Poisson, the second parameter can be used to adjust the variance
independently of the mean, thereby accommodating over or underdispersion. In contrast
a semiparametric estimator takes the conditional mean exp(x0i+!i) and makes minimal
assumptions as to the density of !i, other than !i is a sequence of i.i.d random variables
with mean zero and uncorrelated with xi.17
A exible partially parametric specication can also be achieved by modelling the
relationship between the mean and variance, with the variance not fully specied. Esti-
mation is then based upon the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator, bPMLE,
which has the same rst-order conditions as the baseline Poisson model and is consistent
for  under the weaker assumption of correct specication of the conditional mean. The
covariance matrix for bPMLE is given by
Var[bPMLE] =
 
nX
i=1
i()xix
0
i
! 1 nX
i=1
gixix
0
i
! 
nX
i=1
i()xix
0
i
! 1
; (14)
16This ensures a closed form expression for (13).
17See Zhen (2008).
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where gi = Var[Cijxi] is the conditional variance of Ci. In the case where gi = i() we
have the Poisson model and
Var[bP] =
 
nX
i=1
i()xix
0
i
! 1
: (15)
For V ar[Cijxi] = (1+i())i() and V ar[Cijxi] = (1+)i(), we have variants of the
negative binomial model, respectively NB2 and NB1. For Var[Cijxi] = E[(Ci   x0i)2jxi]
unspecied a consistent estimate of Var[bPMLE] is a variant of the Eicker-White robust
sandwich variance estimator. As noted by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) the modication
of the Poisson regression model in this way represents an example of the generalised linear
model (GLM) (see Nelder and Wedderburn (1972)). The essential characteristic of these
models is that consistency requires a correct specication of the conditional mean.
In this paper we adopt an alternative exible estimation framework, namely the Gen-
eralised Method of Moments (GMM). Given that the mean of a count process is non-
negative then it is convenient to write the conditional mean of CEB as an exponential
function of a linear index in the regressors. A GMM approach is particularly suited to
the estimation of the parameters of this non-linear regression function since by using
rst-order conditions only it allows us to depart from a highly restrictive Poisson speci-
cation, allow for unobserved heterogeneity without a full set of parametric assumptions,
and accommodate endogenous regressors. The GMM estimator is based on the moment
conditions E(vijxi) = 1, where vi = exp(!i). To see this note that the conditional mean
function with multiplicative errors is given by
E(Cijxi; !i) = exp(x0i + !i) = i()vi: (16)
The conditional expectation of Ci with respect to xi is then given byE(Cijxi) = i()E(vijxi).18
In the face of endogenous regressors such that E[vijxi] 6= 1, the conditional moment re-
strictions are given by E(vi 1jzi) = 0. The GMM estimator minimises the (generalized)
length of the empirical vector function
^GMM  argmin
2
 N(w;)
0 ~Q 1N  N(w;); (17)
where w collects all observables including C, potentially endogenous regressors x, and
instrumental variables z. Given a multiplicative error model then  N(w;) = Z
0(y  
18We note that given the use of a multiplicative model then any additional underlying regression
error would be absorbed by the unobserved heterogeneity term !i. See Mullahy (1997) for an extended
discussion of this point.
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()=()) such that we can write (17) as
^GMM  argmin
2
[
1
n
Z0(C  ()=())]0 ~Q 1N [
1
n
Z0(y   ()=())];
where () = exp(X0) and Z = fzig denotes an instrument matrix.19 ~QN = Z0
Z
denotes the optimal weight matrix where 
 = (C   (b)=(b))2. (b) = exp(X0b) withb a rst step GMM estimator based upon any weighting matrix.
6 Conditional Mean Specication
In this study we extend the Beckerian utility model for children ever born to account for
the impact of interactions across households which belong to distinct ethnic groups and
reside in clusters of households.20 We write the conditional mean as
E(CjxI ;h;p;e) = exp(e+ cE[f(Cjcl)] + edcl + h0 + p0+ xI0): (18)
(18) includes the standard set of individual (xI), household (h), and cluster (p) character-
istics, with associated vectors of parameters ; ; and . c and  are scalar parameters
denoting, respectively, endogenous and exogenous e¤ects.21 e denotes a categorical vari-
able denoting ethnic a¢ liation.
Below we turn our attention to the specication of the endogenous and exogenous
e¤ects, integrating the econometric specication with the theoretical model outlined in
section 4.
6.1 Endogenous and Exogenous Interaction E¤ects
In section 4 we discussed a model in which endogenous local neighbourhood e¤ects and
exogenous global ethnic e¤ects might have inuence on fertility decisions. We represent
endogenous e¤ects attributable to the fertility choices of other women in the same cluster
using
cE[f(Cjcl)] = @Se2(Ci; C
cl
 i)=@Ci = 
c(Ccl i   Ci); (19)
19The GMM estimator GMM accounts for both the endogeneity of one or more of the elements of x
and the intrinsic heteroscedasticity of i() = exp(x0i).
20As such the fundamental characteristic which di¤erentiates our approach from multilevel (variance
components) techniques is that we assign, theoretically as well as empirically, a more prominent role to
the mechanisms by which social interactions a¤ect fertility behaviour. Although the failure to account for
dependencies across observations can result in ine¢ cient estimation, our focus is to build an appropriate
structural model of the interactions. See Moulton (1986), Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlak (1978).
21For clarity of exposition we restrict c to be a scalar quantity. However, in the empirical section we
allow endogenous e¤ects to vary across ethnic groups such that c is now a vector.
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where Ci denotes the number of children ever born to woman i, and Ccl i is the mean
CEB for cluster cl. c represents the cross-partial e¤ect22 @
2Se2(:)
@Ci@C
cl
 i
.
We represent exogenous e¤ects attributable to observing the education of other women
in the same cluster using edcl = 1ncl
P
i2cl
edi with edi denoting the education level of the ith
woman residing in the same cluster, and ncl denotes the number of individuals resident
in the cluster. It is argued that the e¤ect of education is iconic, with some individuals
aspiring to the attributes of other higher educated members within their cluster. We
choose to model these education interactions at the level of the cluster as higher educated
women in the locality may be leaders and opinion-makers who inuence others who are
less educated to adopt low fertility norms. Hence we consider the proportion of women
in the cluster who had completed higher education as representative of this exogenous
education e¤ect on fertility.23
We also include a number of other cluster attributes to reduce the likelihood of spurious
inference. Critical in this respect is access to water and fuel infrastructure. Based upon
the work of Dasgupta (2000), better access to water and fuel reduces the demand for
child labour to collect them, and that this is turn reduces the demand for children, and
hence the fertility rate (Iyer (2002)). Access to fuel was measured by a mean-level e¤ect
for access to electricity. Access to water infrastructure at the cluster-level was measured
according to whether access to water was located (i) in the residence (either piped into the
residence or a well was located in the residence); (ii) obtained from a publicly-provided
source (either a public tap or a public well); (iii) obtained by collecting it from a river,
stream, pond or lake; or (iv) whether rainwater was relied upon as the chief source of
water. In addition, an additional cluster-level attribute included was whether or not a
radio was listened to at least once a week which again was aggregated up from whether
or not an individual listened to a radio.
6.2 Household-level and Individual-level Controls
We control for a number of household and individual characteristics that we know might
also have an impact on fertility decisions to ensure that the endogenous and exogenous
e¤ects observed at the cluster level are robust to variations in other characteristics. The
choice of variables is in keeping with a long lineage of economic models of fertility deci-
sions. These factors include household structure (whether it is polygytnous or not); the
22The notation S1() and S2() refers, respectively, to the proportionate and conformist social utility
functions presented in Section 4.
23It is important to clarify that we are using a proportionate metric for the exogenous e¤ect as we
believe that the average level of education has an inuence on fertility behaviour due to the iconicvalue
of education discussed earlier, rather than the distance of a particular womans educational attainment
from the attainment of better-educated women in the group. Therefore we argue that the proportionate
metric is a better representation of the womans actual behaviour than the conformist metric, at least
with reference to the e¤ect of education on fertility outcomes.
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number of other household residents; the age of the woman; household income and other
characteristics.
Polygyny can have two impacts on fertility: rst, it can increase fertility if there is
more help provided with child-care, creating a micro-level externality within the extended
family household. Second, if there is greater discussion of family planning issues, then this
might work to reduce fertility. Alternatively if high-fertility norms are espoused within
the extended household then the e¤ect might be to increase fertility.24 There are 30% of
households in the sample that had more than one wife living in the household and in our
model we control for the number of usual residents in the household. The rationale for
the inclusion of this variate is that if other household members help with child care, or
indeed as with other African societies where fosterageis common, other residents have
an important bearing on a womans total fertility.25
We also include controls for income and other characteristics. One notable problem
here is that in the DHS no direct questions on income were asked of survey respondents.
Utilising a series of questions asked about household quality, access to infrastructure, and
the ownership of consumer durables, it was possible to construct a number of indicators
which control for the economic status of households. The quality of roof construction was
measured on the following (increasing quality) scale: iron (mabati), tiles, grass or thatch,
and other material. The quality of the oor was measured using (decreasing quality)
scale: mud, dung or sand, wood planks, tiles or polished wood, and cement. Other
indicators of the quality of housing infrastructure were whether or not it had a toilet,
and the number of rooms for sleeping. The status of the household was also proxied by
ownership of consumer durables including whether or not the household owns a radio,
a television, a telephone, and a bicycle. We also include a mortality variable here that
measures whether the woman had a son or daughter who had died.
Two other important household-level attributes that we also use are (i) a measure
of infant mortality, and (ii) reported awareness of HIV/AIDS in the population. These
factors are included in order to control for the fact that Kenya, as like other countries
in Africa, has seen a large increase in HIV-related deaths over the time period under
study which might also a¤ect fertility. This is because demographers think that higher
infant and child mortality is frequently associated with higher fertility rates if parents
want to replace children who are lost to child death, or if they perceive that the average
mortality rate in their region is high. So we control for mortality changes which might
also inuence fertility in this country.
Individual-level controls include the age of the woman measured in years and an age-
24A number of recent studies have examined the role of polygynous marriage norms in inuencing
demographic behaviour. See for example Hogan and Biratu (2004).
25A number of other demographic studies of poor societies (see, for example, Iyer (2002)) have found
that the role played by residents within the household or within close proximity, such as friends and
neighbours, is important for fertility.
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squared variable accounting for the non-linearity associated with age-related variables.
The education of the woman is included and measured as the highest level of education
attained, separating out primary, secondary, and higher education e¤ects. The inuence
of the media was measured as whether the woman listened to the radio at least once
a week. This variable was included on the assumption that greater information about
contraceptive technology would be available to the woman if she listened to the radio.26
A binary variable recorded how long the woman had lived in the community.27 This
variable was included on the assumption that if a woman has resided in the community
for a longer period, then she was more likely to have formed stronger networks in the
cluster, which in turn may inuence her fertility behaviour.We also include a variable
here for whether the individual knows a place to test for HIV/AIDS.
Given that our sample includes women between 15 and 49 years of age, we account
for the fact that for younger women we e¤ectively observe truncated fertility lifetimes
by adding the variables ageand age squaredto control for the fact that older women
would have completed their childbearing, and therefore might display higher fertility,
relative to younger women in the sample. This also addresses the time inconsistency
problem in using DHS data that women may be making decisions with respect to their
fertility considerably before the time when they were selected for survey and interview,
and that therefore their current economic status (as for example measured by ownership
of consumer durables, or the current state of the roof quality or oor quality in their
homes) may not be as representative of their economic status at the time that they
made their decision about having a child, as has been pointed out by Arulampalam and
Bhalotra (2003).
7 The Identication Problem
The nature of the identication problem in models of social interaction depends upon
the observed data, the model, and whether the analyst seeks to identify exogenous and
endogenous e¤ects. For example, if we rewrite the conditional mean from (18) within
a linear framework, and allow for the existence of exogenous e¤ects for all individual
characteristics, namely
E(CjxI ;h;p;e) = e+ cE(Ccl i   Cijcl) + E[xI jcl] + h0 + p0+ xI0; (20)
26Messages about this are routinely broadcast on the national radio channel, the Voice of Kenyain
English, Swahili and the vernaculars.
27If she had lived in the same community since 1993 then this variable took the value 0; if she had
migrated in the interim period and had therefore lived in at least two communities, then this variable
took the value 1.
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then the genesis of the identication problem derives from the simple observation that in
(20) we specify a model for children ever born which is linear in a mean endogenous e¤ect,
E(Ccl i   Cijcl); and a vector of mean exogenous e¤ects, E[xI jcl]. It therefore follows
that the reduced form representation of the conditional mean E(CjxI ;h;p;e) will be a
function of E(xjcl):28 This is obviously central to the question of identication. Namely
we start with the intention of disentangling a mean group (cluster) e¤ect, in terms of the
three components E(Ccl i   Cijcl); E(xI jcl); and E(ujxI ;h;p;cl), where u is the error
in the underlying linear regression model. We then observe that, not surprisingly, the
reduced form E[Ccl i   Cijcl)] is a function of E(xjcl):
There are a number of ways to circumvent the identication problem.29 Within a linear
framework the simplest yet probably the most restrictive method, is to impose a full set
of zero restrictions on  = 0, thereby adopting the assumption that any interactions
are mediated solely by endogenous e¤ects. We note that such an approach is potentially
problematic for making inference on multiplier e¤ects, since such restrictions may result in
biased estimates of pure endogenous e¤ects. This is important since policy proscriptions
which follow from endogenous versus exogenous e¤ects are likely to be very di¤erent.
However, the upside of such an approach is that these restrictions automatically generate
a possible set of instruments (E(xjcl)).30 Second, and as discussed earlier, although it
is possible to conceive of a large number of exogenous e¤ects, in the specic context
of fertility behaviour education plays a particularly prominent role. As a result and
following Brock and Durlauf (2000), identication is facilitated by locating individual
level variables whose group level average does not enter the conditional mean.
In addition to the imposition of a partial set of zero restrictions on , identication
is achieved as a consequence of a correctly specied functional form. Namely, we apply
a link function to the conditional expectation E(CjxI ;h;p;e) so as to correctly represent
the nature of the observed data. We note that identication is then achieved as a result
of the specied nonlinear model, rather than as a specically targeted means to blur the
linear dependence between endogenous and exogenous e¤ects. The conditional mean is
then written as (18). As a consequence the linear dependence between these two objects
is automatically removed given that the we have imposed a restriction on the support of
E(Cjcl): between zero and {; where { is the maximum number of children ever born.31
28See Manski (1993) for further details.
29Graham (2008).
30See, for example, Case and Katz (1991) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001). See Kawaguchi (2004)
for an approach which utilises subjective perceptions of peers average behaviour, instead of average
behaviour.
31See Brock and Durlauf (2003) for a discussion of multinomial choice with social interactions.
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7.1 Endogeneity Bias and the Use of Metereological Data as an
Instrument for Fertility
In specifying the conditional mean, endogenous cluster conformist e¤ects are given by
(Ccl i   Ci), for Ci denoting children ever born to woman i; and Ccl i denoting mean
fertility in the cluster. To circumvent the problem of endogeneity we make the case that
observed variations in actual fertility rates across regions reect the time-series and geo-
graphical variations in rainfall. We contend that for tropical countries like Kenya which
both experience hot weather, and exhibit less fertility control than in developed coun-
tries, properties of the distribution of rainfall, and in particular the mean and variance,
represent a valid instrument for the observed variation in fertility. Given that ethnic
groups tend to reside in distinct regions then geographic variation in rainfall is likely to
explain variation in fertility rates by ethnicity.
The use of rainfall data as an instrument is based on a number of arguments. First,
in low-income countries in which fertility regulation is not practiced extensively, and
in which parents calculate the costs and benets of having an additional child based
on factors like their income (Becker (1981)), rainfall variations will inuence fertility
behaviour. For example, in periods of drought when income is likely to be low, parents
might postpone childbearing (Lam and Miron (1996)). Second, high temperatures will
have an e¤ect on conception and thereby on fertility. Combining these two economic and
biological arguments, we note that in areas of abundant rainfall, which are on average
cooler and have lower temperatures, we expect a priori that these areas will also be areas
of higher fertility. This is because in areas of abundant rainfall, income will be high. Areas
that are very arid and receive on average very poor rainfall are also likely to be those
with very high hot weather temperatures, and will exhibit lower fertility as conception
rates are likely to be low. We would therefore expect to observe higher fertility in better
rainfall-fed districts of Kenya as compared to those which have lower rainfall.
In addition to the impact of mean rainfall, we argue that the seasonality of rainfall
exerts an additional independent e¤ect on fertility decisions, and as such represents an
additional instrument. The argument for the use of this instrument is based on the notion
that seasonality of rainfall proxies uncertainty.32 The impact of a reduction in uncertainty
on fertility can be either positive or negative. If parents view children as an investment
good then a decrease in uncertainty can reduce the insurance value of having children
and thus decrease the net benet of having children (Iyer and Velu (2006)). Alternately,
if children or child servicesare viewed purely as a consumptiongood, then a decrease
in uncertainty is likely to result in parents that are more likely to have more children as
the desired number of children rises. The net impact on fertility will depend upon the
32Recent papers in economic demography have also been examining the impact of uncertainty and the
real options approach in order to understand decision-making about fertility (see, for example, Iyer and
Velu (2006); Bhaumik and Nugent (2008).
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relative e¤ects of the decrease in uncertainty and the decreased benet of the insurance
e¤ect of children (see Iyer and Velu (2006) for a thorough discussion).
8 Data and characteristics of DHS survey
Reecting the population breakdown in the country as a whole, our sample, taken from
the Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS)Ken (1999),33 has data on the
Kalenjin, the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kamba, Kisii, Mijikenda/Swahili and Meru/Embu.34
The Kenya DHS adopted a two-stage stratied sampling approach that selected house-
holds located within primary sampling units (PSU) or sampling clusters. These clusters
are identical to the complete enumeration of sample clusters which took place as part of
the 1977 National Demographic Survey. The sample points themselves are identical to
those chosen in the sampling frame maintained by the Kenyan Central Bureau of Statis-
tics. In the 35 of Kenyas 42 districts that were included in the survey, there were 536
clusters - 444 rural clusters and 92 urban clusters, of which 530 were non-empty clus-
ters.35 The location of the clusters geographically are identiable within the district and
province (DHS and Macro International, 1999: 179-182). A complete list of all house-
holds in each cluster was recorded between November 1997 and February 1998. From the
remaining 530 clusters, a systematic sample was drawn of, on average, 22 households in
urban clusters and 17 households in rural clusters. This formed a total of 9465 house-
holds. In these households, all women age 15-49 were targeted for interview. Response
rates varied by province from approximately 88% to 99% (for more details see KDHS,
1998 p.180).
In addition to the geographical stratication of data by cluster and household, it is
also possible to stratify these data by ethnicity. As also discussed in section 2, the major
Kenyan ethnic groups (covering 88% of the population) are Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba,
Kalenjin, Kisii and Mijikenda/Swahili. The Kikuyu is the largest, with 17.9% of the
population, while Mijikenda/Swahili is the smallest, with 5.0%. The representation of
each group in the sample is similar to its representation in the whole population. The
largest number of women included in the sample live in the Rift Valley region, while the
smallest number of women sampled live in Nairobi. Looking at the distribution by ethnic
group, the largest sample was drawn from the Kalenjin group, while the smallest was
33The survey contains interview data for 7800 women aged 15-49. It contains women from all of
Kenyas large ethnic groups and covers a wide geographical area, omitting only the areas of extremely
low population density in the North. Geographically. Kenya is divided into 7 provinces which are further
subdivided into 47 districts. The Kenya DHS covered 42 of Kenyas districts; 35 were sampled, 7 were
not. 17 districts were oversampled.
34Our study excludes the Maasai, a pastoral group living in the Kenyan Rift Valley, and other tribes
such as the Galla and Somalis, who live in the north-east.
356 of the clusters could not be included in the survey due to inaccessibility (DHS and Macro Interna-
tional 1999: 180).
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drawn from the Meru/Embu group.
According to the DHS data, a rural woman has on average about 5.2 children com-
pared to fertility among urban women at 3.1 children. Fertility di¤erentials by the level
of education show that illiterate women bear on average 5.8 children compared to 3.5
children for women with secondary school education (DHS 1998, p. xvii). The sample
reveals demographic di¤erences between ethnic groups: for women aged 40-49, the mean
CEB varies from 5.91 for Kikuyu to 7.56 for Luo. The di¤erences in fertility by ethnic
group are clearly very large. Table 1 shows the mean CEB grouped by region in the
sample. CEB varies from a low of 1.7 in Nairobi/Central to a high of 3.3 in Nyanza. This
pattern is also seen by region. The Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya and the Luo follow similar
patterns. For example, CEB is low among the Kikuyu (in the Nairobi region), and high
amongst the Luo (in the Nyanza region).
The DHS data show that knowledge of family planning in Kenya is very high: 98% of
women and 99% of men were able to name at least one modern method of contraception.
There are 39% of women who use contraception and the most widely used methods are
contraceptive injectables, the pill, female sterilization and periodic abstinence. Contra-
ceptive use does however vary greatly by region: while there are 61% of women in the
Central province who use contraception, only 22% of women in the Coast province do so
likewise. Only 23% of women with no education use contraception compared to 57% of
women with secondary education. Both government and private medical sources provide
access to contraceptives.
In the data used in the present study we consider individual-level data only for the
5994 women residing in a rural cluster, and who did respond. Table 3 presents the counts
of children ever born in the sample.
8.1 Constructing the rainfall instruments
In this study we use unique historical meteorological data on monthly rainfall collected
for us by the Kenyan Meteorological Department from thirty-one meteorological stations
in Kenya at 5-year intervals, from 1930 to 2005. This data was aggregated into yearly
average rainfall and its standard deviation by rainfall station in each Kenyan district.
Below we outline the matching exercise that allowed us to assign to each woman for each
birth that she underwent, an average annual rainfall estimate for that district at the time
closest to the year of the birth of her child.
The matching of the metereological and the DHS data proceeded by assigning, for each
observation in a particular district, rainfall data which minimised the Euclidean distance
between the district capital and the nearest metereological station.36 To quantify the
impact of uncertainty on fertility, we construct an index for the seasonality of the rainfall
36Using latitude and longitude data for the district capitals and those of the meteorological stations.
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across the meteorological stations in Kenya over the course of a year. For each year
the index takes the di¤erence between the average rainfall in the wettest and the driest
three months, and scales them by the average rainfall for the year for that particular
meteorological station (see Foeken (1994)). This is reported as the index of District
Rainfall Seasonality (DRS). We also report the standard deviation of mean rainfall in
2005.
Table 4 depicts the geographical variations in rainfall across the di¤erent provinces
of Kenya. Rainfall is highest on the western coast of Kenya (the Western province and
Nyanza) in which fertility rates are also the highest (3.2 and 3.3). Mean rainfall is lowest
in Nairobi which also depicts the lowest fertility (1.6). As shown in Table 5, rainfall in
Kenya is highly seasonal and varies considerably by geographical region. We examine
correlations between the total number of children ever born and the average rainfall by
district in Kenya. This correlation is positive and is 0.437 for our measure of total fertility
children ever born with average rainfall by district. For women who have 10 births or
fewer, this correlation was even stronger at 0.4598. Table 6 shows for the year 1998
children ever born by province, mean rainfall and rainfall seasonality for the di¤erent
Kenyan regions.
Looking at Tables 4, 5 and 6 collectively, suggests that lower rainfall seasonality might
be associated with higher fertility: the greatest seasonality of rainfall is in Nairobi, the
Central province and the eastern province, the three regions that also have the lowest
fertility. Of course these ndings could also be driven by other characteristics of these
provinces such as income or education, and in the models presented in Section 10 below
we examine the e¤ect of our rainfall instrument after controlling for some of these other
factors. Su¢ ce to say at this stage however that if we look simply at the correlations
between these rainfall patterns and fertility rates across the di¤erent provinces of Kenya,
it would appear that the areas with the highest rainfall, and lowest rainfall seasonality,
are also those in Kenya which show the highest fertility.
We therefore contend that by using rainfall as an instrument both with respect to its
absolute amounts as measured independently at metereological stations, and by consid-
ering also its seasonality that di¤ers across the di¤erent provinces of Kenya, this measure
provides independent exogenous variation for the endogenous fertility behaviour.
9 Results
Table 7 presents our results using the GMM estimator with the number of children ever
born (CEB) instrumented using mean rainfall and the seasonality index. The dependent
variable in the model is the number of children ever born. Parameter estimates may be
interpreted as the proportional change in the number of children ever born due to a unit
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change in the regressors.37 Since the predicted count is given by ex
0^, we also report
the factor change in the expected count for a unit increase in a given xk, denoted e^;
and emphasise this statistic when interpreting our results. We report bootstrap standard
errors using 150 replications and use the Huber (1967) method to account for any residual
intra-cluster correlation.
Endogenous e¤ects The localised endogenous e¤ects emanating from within the
village cluster, are captured by a parameter which, for each ethnic group (e), weights
the variable (Ce;cl   Ci) - namely the di¤erence between a mean-level and individual
CEB (instrumented by rainfall) for women who live in the same cluster. We observe that
for 7 out of 8 groups these parameter are signicant and positive with e¤ects ranging
from 1.189 for the Kikuyu, 1.20 for the Kamba, 1.17 for the Luhya, to 1.11 for the Luo.
The only group for whom these e¤ects were not signicant was the Kisii. A key aspect
of these results is that consistent with our anthropological understanding of the ethnic
groups (and as discussed in section 3), for those clusters in which individuals were related
both by blood and marriage, as for example, among the Kikuyu mbari, the endogenous
e¤ects on fertility are among the stronger of the ethnic group e¤ects on fertility. We
observe that those groups who are related both by blood and by marriage, as for example
the Kikuyu, exhibit signicant and large interaction e¤ects. The importance of these
e¤ects is that they suggest more clearly the channels through which the e¤ect of ethnicity
impacts on fertility. This is important for demographic analyses per se since our results
in indicate the importance for fertility of including a measure which captures the e¤ects
of interactions within ethnic groups, and the fact that they are important over and above
the signicance of individual and household characteristics.
Exogenous e¤ects; cluster-level controls We consider exogenous e¤ects as at-
tributable to the e¤ect of observing the level of education of other women in the same
cluster. We measure this e¤ect using the proportion of women who had completed higher
education, allowing parameters to di¤er by ethnicity and the age of the woman38. The
e¤ects in Table 7 are insignicant after controlling for the individual levels of educational
attainment for all ethnic groups, except the Luo for whom this variable in signicant
at the 10% level and for whom the parameter estimate was of the order of 0.149. In
order to reduce the likelihood of omitted cluster attributes confounding our inferences
on exogenous and endogenous interactions a range of cluster-level controls are included:
these are media access and access to water and fuel infrastructure in the cluster. Among
37This follows since
@E(Cjx)
@xj
= j exp(x
0)
where E(Cjx) = exp(x0):
38For the Mijikanda-Swahili and Kamba ethnic group the numbers of women who had completed higher
education was extremely small across most clusters, and as a result, the exogenous education e¤ect was
constructed utilising the proportion who had completed a secondary school education.
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these cluster-level controls, the e¤ect of the media was signicant and exerted a negative
e¤ect on fertility, with a factor e¤ect of 0.886 decrease. None of the mean-level cluster
e¤ects for water or electricity were signicant.
Household-level e¤ects; regions and ethnic controls At the household level we
make a distinction between interactions within the household which may have implica-
tions for fertility, and household-level controls. Household-level controls are included so
as to reduce the possibility that any inference on household-level interaction e¤ects is
not confounded by household-level omitted variables. None of the household-level social
interaction e¤ect were signicant nor was the infant mortality variable at the household
level. The infant mortality variable measured whether a son or a daughter had died.
In general we would expect that income would be negatively correlated with fertility.
As noted above, one of the problems with the DHS survey is that no direct questions
on income were asked of survey respondents. To address this deciency a number of
household level variables were included as controls for income and other characteristics.
Measures of roong quality are included to suggest that if the woman lived in a household
that was wealthier, as measured by a better quality roof such as iron or tiles, then her
CEB was more likely to be lower, relatively to the base category - a thatched roof. If
a woman lived in a house which had an iron roof, the expected number of children ever
born was likely to be lower than if she was resident in a house with a thatched roof. None
of these variables emerged signicant however. This was also true of the oor quality
variables: if the woman lived in a house which had a cement oor (relative to the base
of sand), then this might have been important but again this was not signicant. Two
variables included in the model which could be construed both as income indicators and
as controls for media access are radio and television ownership but these were also not
signicant at the household level.
All the ethnicity e¤ects were signicant: Kalenjin (1.244), Luhya (1.196), Mijikenda-
Swahili (1.151) and the Luo (1.410) who all showed much higher fertility than the Kikuyu
who formed the base group. Given that in many cases ethnic groups settle in specic
regions, for example 74 % of the population of coastal province are Mijikenda-Swahili, it
was not possible to separately identify all regional e¤ects. Of those regional e¤ects that
we could identify none were signicant.
Individual-level e¤ects As expected many of the individual-level variables were
highly signicant: these included the womans age with an older woman exhibiting higher
fertility compared to her younger counterpart. This is something we might expect if norms
concerning family size have evolved over time. Women today are more likely on average
to have fewer numbers of children compared to previous generations of women before
them. For women, primary and higher education were signicant, and with the expected
signs of positive for primary education and strongly negative for higher education. The
e¤ects of higher education reduces fertility by, on average 0.851. The base category was
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women with no education. Primary education has the expected positive relationship with
CEB.
We also note that if the woman had lived continuously in the community since 1993,
then this was likely to increase her CEB by about 0.900. One reason for this nding may
be that women who stayed more continuously in one region were more likely to benet
from the impact of the greater social capitalgenerated by living in the community for
long periods. It is also possible that they are more likely to form stronger networks
with others if they have lived there longer, and this would be particularly important for
fertility-related issues. In contrast, another factor that was not very important at the
individual level was whether the woman had an awareness of a place to go to test for
HIV/AIDS (measured by a variable KnowPlaceAids).
10 Conclusion
Strategic complementarities in fertility decisions implies that a couples fertility decisions
may be dependent on the actions of others in the vicinity or in the society more widely.
The mechanisms through which these complementarities occur are through social inter-
actions. This paper has examined the importance of social interactions in the context of
fertility behaviour in Kenya. We have examined the role of dependencies across individu-
als that reside in a cluster of households who locate according to ethnicity. By identifying
the multiplicity of these channels, we have a better basis upon which to attempt to in-
uence policy. More signicantly, the existence of multiple channels of social interaction
imply that an analyst attempting to isolate these pathways, needs to be cautious about
the possibility of erroneous inference.
Collectively, our results enable us to determine the relative importance of individual
determinants of fertility alongside a number of channels by which fertility decisions are
inuenced by the behaviour of others. We have demonstrated the signicance of con-
formist endogenous e¤ects on fertility operating at the level of the village cluster, and
di¤erentiated by ethnicity. After controlling for individual education, exogenous e¤ects
were generally not a signicant determinant of fertility. Similarly our results suggest that,
after controlling for a large number of individual e¤ects and other forms of interaction,
the household level interactions are not important. However, our results have conrmed
strongly the importance of ethnic-level e¤ects, alongside the traditional determinants of
fertility at the individual level. Collectively, therefore we argue that social interaction
e¤ects matter greatly for fertility decisions in Kenya.
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Table 2: Mean Education (Years) by Region and Ethnicity.
Region
Nairobi Central Coast Eastern Nyanza Rift Western EED
Valley
Ethnicity
Kalenjin 13.5 0.0 7.0 7.3 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.5
Kamba 9.2 4.9 6.9 6.7 8.5 6.6 - 6.9
Kikuyu 9.5 7.9 9.6 8.7 7.7 7.4 6.7 8.1
Kisii 10.5 6.0 5.5 12.0 6.8 6.7 6.0 6.9
Luhya 8.7 6.8 8.4 9.6 6.0 6.0 7.1 7.0
Luo 8.7 6.7 8.2 8.8 5.9 6.9 8.1 6.3
Meru/Embu 8.9 8.2 7.2 6.5 10.0 8.6 - 6.6
Miji/Swa - 11.0 5.1 4.0 - - 6.0 4.2
RED 9.2 7.8 5.1 6.7 6.3 6.6 7.1 6.7
Note: RED (
E
ED) denotes mean years of education by region (ethnicity).
  denotes zero cell count.
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Table 3: Children Ever Born.
Total Children Frequency Percentage
ever Born
0 1568 26.16
1 777 12.96
2 693 11.56
3 563 9.39
4 540 9.01
5 436 7.27
6 440 7.34
7 309 5.16
8 246 4.10
9 196 3.27
10 128 2.14
11 49 0.82
12 34 0.57
13 10 0.17
14 3 0.05
15 2 0.03
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Table 6: CEB Mean Rainfall; and Rainfall Seasonality by Region
Region CEB Mean Rainfall Rainfall
(1998) (2000) Seasonality
Nairobi 1.69 44.11 2.25
Central 2.51 40.79 2.28
Coast 2.86 75.21 2.52
Eastern 2.83 47.57 2.91
Nyanza 3.31 120.90 1.59
Rift Valley 3.22 71.44 2.02
Western 3.27 117.85 1.28
ALL 2.98 73.98 2.12
40
Table 7: GMMb eb P -value
Individual Level
Age 0.14284 1.15355 0.00000
Age2 -0.00182 0.99818 0.00000
Primary Education 0.03888 1.03964 0.02900
Secondary Education -0.04555 0.95547 0.18800
Higher Education -0.16156 0.85082 0.04000
Listens to radio -0.00288 0.99713 0.63300
Resident since 1993 -0.10494 0.90037 0.00000
KnowPlaceAids 0.01194 1.01201 0.25100
Household Level
Polygyny -0.02205 0.97819 0.31600
Usual Resident -0.01218 0.98789 0.77100
Iron roof -0.00794 0.99209 0.57400
Tiled roof 0.01246 1.01254 0.88000
Wood oor -0.03655 0.96411 0.42500
Tiled oor -0.07928 0.92378 0.43900
Cement oor -0.00718 0.99285 0.61400
Has TV -0.00737 0.99266 0.73400
Has radio 0.01172 1.01179 0.38400
Has telephone 0.00145 1.00145 0.96800
Has bicycle -0.00919 0.99085 0.50500
Mortality 0.04423 1.04523 0.24100
Central -0.01253 0.98754 0.74700
Rift Valley -0.02475 0.97555 0.42800
Nyanza -0.01196 0.98811 0.82600
Kalenjin 0.21871 1.24447 0.00000
Kamba 0.01675 1.01689 0.80000
Kisii 0.08097 1.08434 0.66300
Luhya 0.17899 1.19601 0.02200
Meru-embu 0.04972 1.05098 0.53300
Mijikanda Swahili 0.14131 1.15178 0.09700
Luo 0.34415 1.41078 0.00000
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Table 7 GMM Parameter Estimates (continued)b eb P -value.
Exogenous E¤ects: Cluster Level Ee;cl
Kalenjin -0.41242 0.66204 0.42200
Kamba -0.19543 0.82248 0.85200
Kikuyu -0.82971 0.43618 0.12600
Kisii -0.19361 0.82398 0.76400
Meru-embu -0.66123 0.51621 0.48600
Mijikanda Swahili 2.04896 7.75981 0.17600
Luhya -0.61957 0.53818 0.12500
Luo -1.90338 0.14906 0.06800
Endogenous E¤ects: Cluster-level Ce;cl   Ci
Kalenjin 0.14475 1.15575 0.00100
Kamba 0.18885 1.20785 0.00000
Kikuyu 0.17337 1.18931 0.00200
Kisii 0.14363 1.15446 0.16700
Meru-embu 0.20078 1.22236 0.00000
Mijikanda-Swahili 0.17360 1.18958 0.00100
Luhya 0.15781 1.17094 0.01500
Luo 0.11247 1.11904 0.06500
Cluster-level Controls
Media access (radio) -0.12069 0.88631 0.09200
Water (nat. source) 0.11340 1.12008 0.47800
Water (piped into HH) 0.01116 1.01122 0.94400
Water (public source) -0.02017 0.98003 0.90700
Electricity -0.05212 0.94921 0.24400
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